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Virtual Child Pornography, Pandering, and
the First Amendment: How Developments in
Technology and Shifting First Amendment
Jurisprudence Have Affected the
Criminalization of Child Pornography
by BENJAMIN A. MAINS*

Introduction
Though the depiction of minors engaged in obscene or sexual
acts has been heavily criminalized,' modern technology and the
Internet have allowed for the creation of virtual child pornographysexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but are
produced without the involvement of any real children. Though
children are not directly harmed by the production of this type of
material, Congress has found that virtual child pornography
perpetuates a market for pornography involving actual children and
thereby causes what I refer to as a substantial indirect harm to
society.2 Prosecution for possession and distribution of actual child
pornographic material has also proven exceedingly difficult due to
virtual child pornography, and the Court has struggled to devise a
consistent scheme that can effectively stop the dissemination of this
disturbing virtual material without overly infringing upon protected
speech.'

* Juris Doctor Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; A.B. 2006, Princeton University. I would like to thank Professor Peter Keane for
initially suggesting this topic, and my family for their endless love and support.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008).
2. See infra notes 19,24, 31, 34, 71.
3. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). See also United States v.
Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008).
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In 2008 the United States Supreme Court decided United States

v. Williams,4 a landmark child pornography case, in which the Court

held that offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography
were categorically excluded from First Amendment protection The
Court strove to thwart challenges to current anti-child pornography
statutes-as these statutes were considered overbroad and therefore
vulnerable-by making more expansive definitions of child
pornography.6 The Court accomplished this by shifting the focus
away from proscribing the illicit material itself and instead
criminalizing the expressed intention or belief of the individual
distributing those materials This Note will explore this area of First
Amendment jurisprudence and argue that the confusion over the
constitutionality of virtual child pornography persists. Williams did
not resolve the tension between First Amendment protection and the
need to criminalize virtual child pornography.
The Note is structured as follows: Part I documents the extent to
which easy access to Internet child pornography has fueled a market
for such material and enhanced the link between child pornography
and the facilitation of other crimes against children, such as
molestation. Part II discusses the creation of the child pornography
exception to the First Amendment8 developed in Miller v. California,9
New York v. Ferber,'° and Osborne v. Ohio." Despite the fact that the

Supreme Court held in Ferber that child pornography is not entitled
to First Amendment protection, the Court limited its definition of
child pornography to actual child pornography"2-pornography that
actual children participate in the production of-and left open a
loophole for sexually explicit material that appears to depict minors
but which is produced by technology without the use of actual
children.
Part II argues that the Court in Ferberidentified both direct and
indirect harm to children as being compelling government interests

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830.
Id.
See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
Ferber,458 U.S. at 756.
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for the criminalization of child pornography, 3 but the Court's failure
to criminalize virtual child pornography created a market that, due to
the current availability of the Internet and digital editing technology,
has perpetuated the same perversion and indirect harm to children
that the Ferber Court strove to subdue.
Part III examines the ongoing conflict between legislators and
the courts-both of whom have the same goal: the criminalization of
all forms of child pornography. But while legislators enact laws to
prohibit the production, distribution and possession of child
pornography (with an emphasis on "pandering provisions""), the
courts are in turn compelled to overturn such legislation on First
Amendment grounds. Part III focuses on an analysis of Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition,15 the Supreme Court's response to the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA"), 6 and highlights
unaddressed problems inherent in the opinion for fitting virtual child
pornography into the Ferberrubric.
Part IV examines the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act"), 7
the legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in Free
Speech Coalition. This Part applies the holding from Free Speech
Coalition to the PROTECT Act, arguing that if the PROTECT Act
were analyzed under the same rubric as that which was used to
analyze the CPPA, the PROTECT Act would also be found largely
unconstitutional on the grounds that the CPPA was overbroad. 8 In
Williams, however, the Court, in an attempt to avoid the same
constitutional problems, used a different analysis to examine the
constitutionality of the PROTECT Act, focusing instead on the intent
of the provider of the illicit materials rather than on the content of
the material being distributed. '9
Further, in Free Speech Coalition the possibility was left open
that technology might evolve to the point where it would become
impossible for government to enforce actual child pornography laws

13. Id.
14. Pandering is "the act or offense of selling or distributing textual or visual material
(such as magazines or videotapes) openly advertised to appeal to the recipient's sexual
interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (8th ed. 2004).
15. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2008).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2008); Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1836-37.
18. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256.
19. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830.
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because the courts would be unable prove whether certain
In this event, the
pornographic images were of real children.'
government should not be prevented from enacting appropriately
narrow regulations for virtual child pornography.2'
Today, professional-quality digital editing technology has
developed to a level that paralyzes the government's ability to
effectively enforce actual child pornography laws. These affordable
and widely available photo editing programs provide even the most
amateur digital editor with hundreds of easy-to-use design tools to
create images thate are virtually indistinguishable from original
photographs, films, or videotapes.22
The Williams decision reflects the Court's effort to address these
technological developments. Rather than targeting the nature of the
offensive material itself, as past protective measures have done, the
PROTECT Act's new approach bans collateral speech that is
"intended to cause another to believe" that "purported material is, or
contains.., an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct."23
Part IV asserts, however, that the PROTECT ACT is arguably
just as overbroad as the CPPA, because it criminalizes speech that
reflects a defendant's belief, or "intention [for] another to believe, 24
that the material he proffers is of the type that Congress could
constitutionally prohibit anyone from possessing.
I. The Child Pornography Phenomenon
The proliferation of child pornography in our society is rampant.
As Ernie Allen, President of the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children ("NCMEC"),25 made clear while speaking before

20. Free Speech CoaL, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
21. Id.
22. ConsumerSearch.com, Photo-Editing Software: Full Report, http://www.consumer
search.com/photo-editing-software/review (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2008).
24. Id.
25. National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, National Mandate and
Mission, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=
en_.US&Pageld=1866 (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (describing its mission "to help prevent
child abduction and sexual exploitation; help find missing children; and assist victims of
child abduction and sexual exploitation, their families, and the professionals who serve
them"; and noting that the organization was established, under congressional mandate, "in
1984 as a private, nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization to provide services nationwide for
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members of the United States Congress in September 2006, "[c]hild
pornography has become a global crisis. 2 6 Data compiled by the
NCMEC and other organizations revealed that "19 percent of
identified offenders possessed images of children younger than three
years old; 39 percent of offenders possessed images of children
younger than six years old; and 83 percent of offenders possessed
images of children younger than twelve years old."27 In July 2007, the
NCMEC's Cyber Tip Line "received its 500,000th report of suspected
child pornography and other child exploitation crimes." Thus, this
child pornography phenomenon perpetuates a culture desensitized to
pedophilia and is closely related to the rising levels of crimes against
children in the United States.
The Chief Operations Officer of the FBI's Crimes Against
Children Unit testified before Congress that "there is a clear
correlation between sexual abuse of children and the collection of
child pornography,, 29 and cited an FBI sting operation that caught
ninety-two collectors of child pornography, thirteen of which
admitted to having sexually molested a total of forty-eight children.3"
A 2000 study by the Bureau of Prisons revealed that of sixty-two
offenders convicted of either child pornography or traveling with the
intent to engage in sex with a minor, forty-seven (seventy-six percent)
admitted to committing prior unprosecuted sex crimes against
children. 3' The FBI Chief Operations Officer testified that images of

families and professionals in the prevention of abducted, endangered, and sexually
exploited children").
26. Deleting Commercial Pornography Sites from the Internet. The U.S. Financial
Industry's Efforts to Combat This Problem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 29 (2006)
[hereinafter Deleting Commercial Pornography] (statement of Ernie Allen, President and
Chief Executive Officer, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109-house-hearings&docid=f:
31467.pdf (last visited Feb 27, 2009).
27. Id.
28. The NCMEC CyberTipline is a Congressionally mandated reporting mechanism
for cases of child sexual exploitation including child pornography, online enticement of
children for sex acts, molestation of children outside the family, sex tourism of children,
child victims of prostitution, and unsolicited obscene material sent to a child. Press
Release, National Center. for Missing & Exploited Children, National Cyber Tip Line
Tops 500,000 Reports (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.cybertipline.com/missing
kids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en US&Paged=2446 (last visited Jan 21,2009).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. EnhancingChild ProtectionLaws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
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child pornography "whet [child predators'] appetites for real world
Though viewing child
sexual encounters with children., 32
pornography does not necessarily lead to sex crimes against children,
these statistics suggest that the connection between viewing child
pornography and committing sexual abuse crimes against children is
significant.

Child pornography revenue estimates now surpass $3 billion
annually from the Internet alone, 34 and experts warn that the multibillion-dollar child pornography industry is growing.35 In a recent

case, "investigators identified 70,000 individual customers paying
$29.95 per month and using their credit cards to access graphic images
of small children being sexually assaulted." '

The Internet has

therefore radically changed how child pornography is reproduced and
disseminated. A 1984 study conducted by the Chicago Police
Department confirmed that in almost 100 percent of their annual
child pornography arrests, detectives found photos, films, and videos
of the arrested individual sexually abusing children.37 Today,
however, easy access to child pornography on the Internet has fueled

the market for such material and has enhanced the link between child
pornography and molestation.

When Ernie Allen returned to testify before Congress in July
2007, he stressed that as technology evolves, so does the creativity of

the predator:

Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) (statement of
Michael J. Heimbach, unit chief, Crimes Against Children Unit, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
32. Id.
33. Stephen T. Fairchild, Protecting The Least of These: A New Approach to Child
PornographyPanderProvisions,57 DUKE L.J. 163, 168 (2007).
34. Wade Luders, Child Pornography Web Sites: Techniques Used to Evade Law
Enforcement, 26 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 7, at 17 (2007); Stacia Glenn, Child Porn
Thriving on Web, SAN BERNADINO COUNTY SUN (Cal.), Nov. 5, 2006 (reporting that
"[c]hild pornography is now a multibillion-dollar commercial enterprise").
35. Taryn Brodwater, Tracking Child Porn, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane, Wash.),
Apr. 9, 2007, at Al (reporting that "[c]omputer-related crimes as a whole are increasing,
but those involving child victims are top priority .... ).
36. Deleting CommercialPornography,supra note 26, at 5.
37. Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the Constitution:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 60-61 (2002).
38. Protecting Children on the Internet: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation,110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Ernie Allen).
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New innovations such as webcams and social networking sites
are increasing the vulnerability of our children when they use
the Internet. New technology to access the Internet is used by
those who profit from the predominantly online market in child
pornography and seek to evade detection by law enforcement.3 9
The use of the Internet to victimize children continues to present
increasingly complicated
challenges
that require constant
reassessment of our tools and methods. 4° The Child Exploitation and
Obscenity Section determined that "[t]he technological ease, lack of
expense, and anonymity in obtaining and distributing child
pornography has resulted in an explosion in the availability,
accessibility, and volume of child pornography."l
Child pornography is causally linked to actual child molestation,
and "[researchers] believe that child pornography is central to
pedophiliac psychology, social orientation, and behavior .... [T]he
pedophile can use the computer to troll for and communicate with
potential victims with minimal risk of being identified. 4 2 In addition
to the direct harm to children from child pornography, a child can
also be indirectly "victimized" as the arousal and fantasy fueled by
child pornography can be a prelude to actual sexual activity with
children.43 The proliferation of child pornography is a large scale,
international problem." Equally unsettling, is the difficulty the Court
has encountered in effectively criminalizing and therefore proscribing
the distribution of all forms of child pornography.45

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, DOJ, Child Pornography, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/childporn.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). The Child
Exploitation and Obscenity Section is a special unit of the U.S. Department of Justice that
works with the 93 United States Attorney offices around the country and investigative
agencies to vigorously combat this growing problem.
42. DIANE SCHETKY & ARTHUR GREEN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK
FOR HEALTH CARE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 154 (1988).

43. See KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS FOR
LAW-ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS
INVESTIGATING
CASES
OF
CHILD
SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION 31 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.skeptictank.org/nc70.pdf (last
visited Mar. 21, 2010).
44.

See supra Part I.

45. See infra Parts II-IV.
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I. New York v. Ferber.Direct Harm, Indirect Harm, and the
Virtual Loophole
Child pornography is a reviled form of speech that falls outside
the scope of First Amendment protection and is illegal to produce,
distribute, or possess in the United States. ' The First Amendment
provides that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom
of speech."47 This guarantee of protected expression exists, at least in
part, in order to protect one's right to communicate one's conscience
freely and to encourage public discourse of all views, even those views
which may be considered vile or repugnant at the time of their
airing.4
Although the First Amendment operates by extending
immunity from government regulation to certain forms of speech,
several categories of speech have been held to be unprotected by the
First Amendment.
One category of unprotected speech is
characterized as "obscene" speech. °
51 the United States Supreme
In Miller v. California,
Court
reaffirmed an earlier plurality decision, Roth v. United States,5 2 and
determined that states could permissibly regulate "obscene"
expression despite the First Amendment. 3 The Miller Court defined
the test to be used in determining whether given subject matter was
"obscene" by setting forth three criteria: (1) whether a reasonable
person, applying current "community standards," would find that the
material as a whole work appeals to the "prurient interest, 5 4 (2)
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2008).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
49. Types of unprotected speech include: incitement of illegal activity (See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969)), fighting words (See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)), incitement of a hostile audience (See Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)), libel against a group (See Beaucharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)).
50. Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
51. Id.
52. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that the constitutional test for determining
what constitutes obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment is whether the
material has redeeming social importance) "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance," the Court stated, ". . . have the full protection of [First Amendment]
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." Id.
53. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
54. "Prurient interest" was defined by the Roth Court as "material having a tendency
to excite lustful thoughts." Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. In declaring that "prurient
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whether the work describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way; and (3) whether the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.5 Thus, under the Miller rubric, a depiction of
sexual conduct would be protected speech as long as the work could
be classified as having literary, artistic, political, or scientific value; a
medical textbook focusing on anatomy and depicting sexual
intercourse, for instance, would be protected from regulation due to
its scientific merit.56 The Court did not, however, address the
question of whether depictions of sexual acts involving minors-even
if such depictions had literary, artistic, political, or scientific valuecould be prohibited by the government. 7
In 1982, nine years after the Miller decision, the Supreme Court
heard the first challenge to a child pornography statute in New York
8
v. Ferber.1
A bookseller, Paul Ferber, was convicted under a New
York child pornography law59 for selling films of young boys engaging
in sexual acts to an undercover agent. 6° In Ferber, the Court
addressed the issue of how to deal with depictions of children in
pornographic scenarios that had been left unanswered in Miller. The
Court held that the production and distribution of child pornography
was not protected by the First Amendment guarantee of free speech,
stating that the classification of "child pornography as a category of
material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not
incompatible with our earlier decisions., 61 The Court deferred to the
New York state legislature's findings that involvement in child
pornography was harmful to a child's health,62 and cited several
studies documenting the harmful effects of sexual exploitation on
children later in life and linking children's participation in

interests" were to be determined based on "community standards," as opposed to by a
national standard, Justice Brennan's test for determining whether speech was to be
constitutionally protected created something of a constitutional paradox whereby the First
Amendment was to be applied differently in different locales. Id. at 489.
55. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
56. Id. at 26.
57. In his dissent in Miller, Justice Brennan considered whether state regulation of the
distribution to minors of sexually oriented material to minors would be permissible.
Neither Brennan nor the majority, however, addressed the implications of material whose
content included sexually explicit acts involving minors. Id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Ferber,458 U.S. 747.
59. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (2006).
60. Ferber,458 U.S. at 751-52.
61. Id. at 763.
62. Id. at 757-58.
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pornographic materials to molestation by adults.63 The Court
therefore reasoned in Ferber that the government has a compelling
interest in preventing children from both the direct and indirect harm
of sexual exploitation and that "the states are entitled to greater
6
leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children. 1
It is important to note that the Court based its opinion in Ferber
on the direct harm to actual children caused by child-pornography
materials and not the broader harm that child pornography causes in
society. Direct harm, Justice White reasoned, is the injury inflicted on
the actual children who are the subjects of pornographic materials.65
This injury to a child's physical, mental, psychological, and emotional
well-being is "brutish and pervasive." 66 This kind of harm, the Court
elaborated, includes the additional trauma caused to a child when the
pornographic materials are advertised, distributed, and circulated
because the materials form a "permanent record of the children's
participation,
and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
67
circulation.
Justice White also recognized that "pedophiles use child6
pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity. 1
Furthermore, White noted that "the distribution of photographs and
films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to
the sexual abuse of children.' 69 Thus in making these assertions,
White appears to acknowledge that the production of child
pornography is harmful to the participating children, and the viewing
of child pornography can inspire pedophiles to exploit and abuse even
more children. Because of this intrinsic relationship between child
pornography and the sexual abuse of other children, the
advertisement, distribution and circulation of child pornography
promote the infliction of harm on additional children. This is why
White considered "drying up the market for [child pornographic]
material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling,
advertising, or otherwise promoting the product" to be a compelling

63. Id. at 758 n.9.
64. Id. at 756.
65. Id. at 756-57.
66. Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment
Jurisprudence,11 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (2007).
67. Ferber,458 U.S. at 759.
68. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
69. Ferber,458 U.S. at 759.
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government interest. 70 Justice White appears to distinguish between
two types of harm caused by child pornography: Harm to those
children who directly participate in the production of child
pornography, which I refer to as direct harm, and harm to those
children who are later exploited by child pornography, which I refer
to as indirectharm.
The Ferber Court held that a state may regulate the
dissemination of child pornography because of the state's interest in
closing the distribution network of material that sexually exploits
children.7 1 This holding is not, however, consistent with Justice
White's observation of the indirect harms of child pornography.72
Despite his recognition of the direct and indirect harm child
pornography causes, the Ferberremedy only focused on curtailing the
market for materials that directly harm children, and Justice White's
solution stopped short of creating an absolute prohibition on
materials that indirectly harm children.
The Ferber opinion created a viable loophole for pedophiles:
virtual depictions of children engaged in pornographic situations
nonetheless escaped criminalization if such depictions were
"necessary for literary or artistic value., 73 Further, "a person over the
statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.
Simulation outside of the prohibition of the statute could provide
another alternative. ", 4 White also explained that depictions of sexual
conduct "which do not involve live performance or photographic or
other visual reproduction of live performances, retain First
Amendment protection."75 Thus, though the Supreme Court closed
the front door to the child pornography market in Ferber by
criminalizing the distribution of pornography depicting actual minors,
Justice White nonetheless opened a back door by conceding that
virtual child pornography was protected under the First Amendment
because of the lack of direct harm. Though the Supreme Court later
paved the way for the criminalization of the possession of child
6
pornography in Osborne v. Ohio,"
in that case Justice White provided

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 760.
Id. at 756, 759.
See id. at 760.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id. at 765.
Osborne, 495 U.S. 103.
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no further measures to address this Ferber loophole, and the issue of

the criminalization of virtual child pornography was left unresolved."
Il. The CPPA and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
As a result of the Court's decisions in Ferber and Osborne, child

pornography became a limited, underground phenomenon
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. 78 Improved law enforcement
efforts increased the transaction costs to consumers dealing in child
pornographic materials, and over the next decade Congress acted to
strengthen the prohibition against the dissemination of child
pornography by increasing the minimum punishment from two years
to five years.79 Indeed, it appeared to many that the market for child
pornography had been paralyzed.'
The Internet boom of the mid-1990s, however, presented new
challenges to which legislators and law enforcement were unprepared
to respond as the number of host computers connected to the
Internet grew from 300 in 1981 to 9,400,000 in 1996." Additionally, as
discussed above, new technologies emerged that made it possible for
child pornographers to produce images that appeared to depict

children engaging in sexual acts, but were in fact created by computer
without the use of any actual children.8 ' Because of the virtual
loophole left open in Ferber, child pornographers could present an

77. In Osborne, the Supreme Court upheld a state's ability to convict defendants on
the basis of private possession of child pornography. Justice White reasoned that given
the importance of a state's interest in protecting the victims of child pornography, "we
cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution
chain." Id. at 110. Justice White also recognized that in the eight years since Ferber,much
of the child pornography market had been driven underground, and as a result, it was now
difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking
production and distribution. Id.
78.

PHILIP

JENKINS,

BEYOND

TOLERANCE:

CHILD

PORNOGRAPHY

ON

THE

INTERNET 39-40 (2001).
79. Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 704(b), 100 Stat.
1783-75. The minimum sentence for distribution, transportation, sale, intent to sell, or
knowing receipt, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)-(3) (2000), was later increased to fifteen years for
repeat offenders of crimes against children by the PROTECT Act. PROTECT Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 103(b)(1)(C)(iii), 117 Stat. 650, 653.
80. JENKINS, supra note 78, at 40. As a precursor to the technological explosion to
come later in the decade, in the early 1990s electronic bulletin boards served to facilitate
communications between parties interested in exchanging and distributing child
pornography. Thus, though this limited computing technology prohibited the distribution
of pornographic material, an electronic distribution network was already thriving. Id at 41-45.
81. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,850 (1997).
82. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
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affirmative defense to a charge under the federal statute 3 by
establishing that the images of children used in their pornographic
materials did not in fact depict actual children.8
Effective
prosecution was therefore unfeasible, as even skilled agents were
unable to distinguish between virtual "children" and actual child
victims of sexual exploitation. 5
In reaction to the influx of new technology, Congress passed
the CPPA to respond to these emerging technologies." Based on
Congressional findings of a compelling state interest in protecting
actual children from all child pornography, whether it depicted real or
virtual children, 7 the CPPA aimed to reduce the volume of virtual
child pornography used by child molesters to "stimulate or whet their
own sexual appetites, '"" to destroy the network of, and market for,
child pornography,89 to protect the privacy of actual children whose
innocent images have been altered to create sexually explicit
depictions, 90 and to deprive child molesters of criminal means used to
facilitate the sexual abuse of children. 91
The CPPA imposed criminal penalties on any person who
knowingly possessed, produced, sold, transported, shipped, received,
mailed, or distributed in interstate or foreign commerce any child
pornography by any means, including by computer.92 The CPPA's
broad scope defined "child pornography" as including "any visual
depiction, including any photography, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 93
The phrases "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" were
added specifically "to close loopholes in our Federal child

83. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2000).
84. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 72 (1996) (statement of Bruce A. Taylor, president

and chief counsel, National Law Center for Children and Families) ("Under present law,
the Government must prove that every piece of child pornography ... is of a real minor
being sexually exploited.").
85. Id.
86.
87.

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2008).
S.REP. No. 104-358, at 2 (1996).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.

93.

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2008).
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94
pornography laws caused by advances in computer technology.,
The CPPA therefore covered actual child pornography, wholly
computer-generated virtual child pornography, as well as morphed
child pornography, and child pornography made by using youthfullooking adults. It also covered the production and promotion of such
pornographic materials.
Additionally, Congress added statutory language that banned the
pandering of such visual depictions by including within the definition
of child pornography any visual depictions that were "advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 95
Congress found that the difficulty in prosecution and enforcement of
child pornography laws, due to the indistinguishability of actual and
virtual child pornography, "could have the effect of increasing the
sexually abusive and exploitive use of children to produce child
pornography" 96 ; the broad scope of the CPPA aimed to eliminate that
difficulty. In sum, the CPPA sought to achieve the government's
compelling interest in protecting children from indirect and direct
harm produced by actual or virtual child pornography, closing the
loophole left open in Ferber.
Shortly after the passage of the CPPA, however, several federal
circuit courts adjudicated cases that challenged the constitutionality
of the CPPA, claiming it to be overbroad. Of these, the First Circuit
in United States v. Hilton,97 the Fourth Circuit in United States v.

Mento,98 the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Fox,99 and the Eleventh

Circuit in United States v. Acheson"° all upheld the constitutionality of
the CPPA. However, all upheld the constitutionality of the CPPA.

94. S.REP. No. 104-358, at 28 (1996).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2008).
96. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2 (1996).
97. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that that CPPA
falls outside constitutionally-protected speech and that the CPPA's definition of child
pornography is "adequately precise").
98. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
"appears to be" language of CPPA remains constitutionally well-defined to substantiate
conviction of defendant).
99. United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming the conviction of
a defendant who knowingly downloaded and transmitted pornographic images of children
from computer at place of employment).

100. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650-53 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing a
defendant's failure to prove CPPA language is sufficiently vague or overbroad).
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Recognizing that the CPPA was a content-based restriction on
speech, these courts applied strict scrutiny review. First, these courts
held that, as laid out in Ferber, the prevention of indirect, as well as
direct harm was a compelling government interest. 10 These courts
held that the CPPA was not unconstitutionally vague, as defined in
Kolender v. Lawson,"°2 because it provided a scienter requirement and
allowed for affirmative defenses.
Thus, the government could
prosecute only those who knowingly possessed, received, or
distributed the prohibited materials.1"3
These courts also held that the CPPA was not unconstitutionally
overbroad because the constitutional standard for substantial
overbreadth-as defined in Broadrick v. Oklahoma"'-was not
satisfied.1 5 Focusing on the "appears to be" and the "conveys the
impression" provisions of the CPPA, these courts determined that
though the statute could reach some individual cases where the
involved materials might be protected, this did not rise to the level of
substantiality required for the CPPA to be declared unconstitutional
on overbreadth grounds."° Not only did the CPPA require virtual
indistinguishability between virtual and real child pornography in
order for the imagery to be prohibited, 7 but these marginal
infringements on protected expression could also be properly handled
on a case-by-case basis.'
One circuit court, however, upon review of the CPPA, did find
the statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad."9
In Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno, the appellant, a trade association involved in the
production and distribution of "adult-oriented materials," feared that
the CPPA's language would prohibit their legitimate work, and filed

101. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 69; Mento, 231 F.3d at 918, 921; Fox, 248 F.3d at 402.
102. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that a statute is not
vague unless it fails to "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement").
103. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74-75; Mento, 231 F.3d at 922; Fox, 248 F.3d at 407; Acheson,
195 F.3d at 652.
104. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (holding that a statute is
unconstitutional only if its overbreadth is substantial in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep).
105. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74; Mento, 231 F.3d at 921; Fox 248 F.3d at 404; Acheson 195
F.3d at 650, 652.
106. Fox, 248 F.3d at 405-06.
107. Id. at 405.
108. Id.
109. 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
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suit against the government shortly after the CPPA's passage.' Like
the petitioners in Fox, Hilton, Mento, and Acheson, the Free Speech
Coalition alleged that the "appears to be" and "conveys the
impression" provisions of the CPPA." were substantially overbroad
and chilled their valid expression of works protected by the First
Amendment."'
After the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court
decision and found the CPPA facially invalid on those grounds,"3 the
government appealed to the Supreme Court, which held in Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition that as written, these provisions of the CPPA
"abridge the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful
114
speech."

The Court therefore held that the ban on virtual child
pornography could not be upheld because it was overbroad and
therefore unconstitutional under the First Amendment."'
The
government presented four arguments in response to the Free Speech
Coalition's theory that the "appears to be" and "conveys the
impression" provisions criminalized "visual depictions, such as
movies, even if they have redeeming social value""' 6 and prohibited
items, such as reproductions of paintings "depicting a scene from
classical mythology," because the subject matter appeared to depict
minors involved in sexually explicit conduct even when real children
were not used." 7
The government reminded the Court of the finding in Ferber that
virtual child pornography causes indirect harm to actual children,'
and contended that the production of virtual pornographic images

110. Brief for Respondents at 9-10, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (No. 00-795). The Free Speech Coalition included a painter of nudes, an erotic
photographer, and the publisher of a naturist-oriented book. The respondents made clear
that their work did not include child pornography, and that they opposed child
pornography by offering a reward for information leading to the arrest of persons involved
in its production. Id.
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B), (D) (2008).
112. Free Speech Coal., 198 F.3d at 1087.
113. Id.
114. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). By the time of the government appeal
to the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, Janet Reno, had been replaced by John
Ashcroft. Therefore, Ashcroft replaced Reno as the petitioner for the government.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 240.
117. Id. at 241.
118. Id. at 250-51.
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can lead to child abuse." 9 The Free Speech Coalition Court did not,
however, accept the government's indirect harm argument and noted
instead that "[v]irtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related'
to the sexual abuse of children., 120 "[T]he causal link is contingent
and indirect."12' Thus, the Free Speech Coalition Court seemed to
hold that the Ferber decision provided no support for the elimination
of the distinction between actual and virtual child pornography.
Though the Court did not deny that virtual child pornography causes
indirect harm, the Court seemed to nonetheless deny that the
prevention of indirect harm was sufficient to justify the banning of
virtual child pornography.
The problem with this aspect of the Free Speech Coalition
decision is that it is patently inconsistent with Ferber in terms of the
government's interest in preventing the indirect harm caused by child
pornography. As discussed above, Ferber explicitly determined that
there is an "intrinsic relationship" between child pornography and
indirect harm to children. 22 The Ferber Court listed the prevention of
indirect harm as one of five compelling government interests, 3 and
asserted, "the distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual
activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children.' ' 24 By definition, virtual child pornography is virtually
Thus, if the
indistinguishable from actual child pornography.
prevention of child pornography's indirect harm suffices to be a
compelling government interest, the prevention of that indirect harm
caused by virtual child pornography should also suffice. The Free
Speech Coalition Court, however, failed to acknowledge that the
Supreme Court had ever held that the protection of children from
indirect harm of child pornography was a compelling interest, and
consequentially denied that the protection of children from virtual
child pornography was a compelling interest.'2' In order to serve its
purpose of invalidating the CPPA, the Court therefore overturned
Ferberon this issue, but without admitting the change.'26

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Ferber,458 U.S. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251.
Id.
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The government's second argument in Free Speech Coalition
further asserted that virtual child pornography could have the
tendency to persuade the audience to commit crimes. 27 The Court
disagreed and rejected this argument as well, stating, "the prospect of
crime, however, by itself, does not justify laws suppressing protected
speech."' ' Even if virtual pornography encourages unlawful
129 acts, the
Court held that it "is not a sufficient reason for banning it.
The government's third argument asserted that the elimination
of the market for actual child pornography was a sufficient
justification for the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the
CPPA.13° The Court again disagreed and suggested that the market
for actual child pornography could, in fact, be eliminated by the use of
virtual images rather than the prohibition of them. If virtual images
are identical to illegal child pornography, the Court argued, "few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if
fictional, computerized images would suffice.''.
This argument relies on the false assumption of pragmatic
rationality, and it is therefore inherently problematic. The Free
Speech Coalition opinion assumes that child pornographers are
pragmatically rational. This assumption is inaccurate, because if child
pornographers were rational, they would not use or create child
pornography in the first place. As described by numerous experts,
the motivation behind the creation of child pornography is not
grounded in rational thought; unfortunately, these child molesters
and pornographers derive sexual gratification from the pain inflicted
on actual children, and the recording of it.132 This false assumption of
pragmatic rationality therefore leads to a highly problematic theory
of desirability. Under this theory, it seems that the Court is asserting
that virtual child pornography is in fact desirable for society because
it drives illegal actual child pornography from the market, and the
"best defense against child pornography may be to embrace virtual
pornography."13 3

127. Id. at 245.
128. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 245 (citing Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684,680 (1959)). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,566 (1969).
129. Id. at 253.
130. Id. at 254.
131. Id.
132. Audrey Rogers, Playing Hide and Seek: How to Protect Virtual Pornographers
and Actual Children on the lnternet, 50 VILL. L. REv. 87, 102 (2005).
133. Id. at 111.
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According to the Court, a commercial market for virtual child
pornography was the solution for actual child pornography. But,
again, this desirability theory wrongly assumes that child
pornographers are pragmatically rational. Thus, these producers of
child pornography would not be interested in virtualpornography as a
viable substitute, nor would some purveyors of child pornography
have their appetites satiated if they knew they were viewing images of
Moreover, permitting and protecting a
virtual pornography.
commercial market for virtual child pornography positively promotes
the indirect harm to children as a result of the use and production of
virtual images that was explicitly outlined in Ferber. This is highly
problematic, regardless of whether or not regulation against virtual
child pornography is constitutional.
The government's final argument in Free Speech Coalition
pointed to the potential for more difficult prosecutions of actual child
molesters and pornographers due to the fact that virtual images look
so realistic. 1" The Court responded by asserting that the CPPA
impermissibly passed this difficulty on to defendants; by allowing a
defendant to affirmatively defend on the grounds that the alleged
child pornography was made using real persons who were adults and
that the material was not marketed as depicting children, the
defendant would, essentially, carry the burden of proving that the
material was protected by the First Amendment. 135 The Court
therefore noted, "The Government may not suppress lawful speech as
the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not
become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter."'3 6
The Court therefore invalidated the CPPA for overbreadth in
Free Speech Coalition because the CPPA criminalized the possession
of visual depictions that appeared to be minors (but might have
actually been adults or computer renderings) as well as material that
had been pandered in a way that "conveyed the impression" that it
was child pornography, regardless of whether it actually was child
pornography. Indeed, the Free Speech Coalition Court had a
legitimate concern that the "conveys the impression" provision of the
CPPA could apply to speech that merely conveyed the impression of
prohibited speech but did not actually contain prohibited content.'37

134.
135.
136.
137.

Free Speech CoaL, 535 U.S. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257.
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The CPPA is a content-based regulation, and should not have such
application.
Having admitted this, the Court's suggestion of
interpreting the CPPA's scienter requirement as applying to the
content of the material in question could effectively resolve this
problem. The Court in Broadrick had warned that the overbreadth
doctrine is "strong medicine," and should be used "sparingly and only
as a last resort."'38 Thus, striking down the entire statute was not a
proper response when a less destructive solution-more narrowly
construing the scienter requirement-existed.
After Free Speech Coalition, the government's enforcement fears
were realized, as prosecuting purveyors of child pornography became
exceedingly difficult. Because the government could not prosecute a
child pornographer unless it proved that the pornographic images
were of actual children, " 9 the Free Speech Coalition decision imposed

a heavy burden on the government in prosecuting any illegal child
pornographers, given that the technology made virtual child
pornography
and
actual
child
pornography
effectively
indistinguishable. Congress, in fact, noted that "the [Free Speech
Coalition] decision has placed prosecutors in a difficult position."'4 °
Indeed, as it turned out, prosecutors were unable to meet that
burden, which resulted in the re-proliferation of virtual child
pornography. 4 '
Free Speech Coalition also created significant confusion in the
lower courts in adjudicating child pornography cases. In United States
v. Kimler, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that despite the Free
Speech Coalition decision, "[j]uries are still capable of distinguishing
between real and virtual images.' ' 42 Yet, in United States v. Deaton,
the Eighth Circuit held that it was not unreasonable to accept "a
jury's conclusion that real children were depicted even where the
images themselves were the only evidence the government presented
on the subject.' ' 13 Furthermore, in United States v. Hall, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a pre-Free Speech Coalition conviction on the ground
that "no reasonable jury could have found that the images were
138. Broadrick,413 U.S. at 613.
139. Rogers, supra note 132, at 111.
140. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4 (2003).
141. Robert M. Sieg, Attempted Possession of Child Pornography-A Proposed
Approachfor CriminalizingPossession of Child PornographicImages of Unknown Origin,
36 U. TOL. L. REV. 263, 263 (2005).
142. United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003).
143. United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003).
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virtual children created by computer technology as opposed to actual
children." ' " In United States v. Slanina, the Fifth Circuit held that the
"[g]overnment was not required to present any additional evidence or
expert testimony to meet its burden of proof to show that the images
downloaded by [the defendant] depicted real children, and not virtual
children," 4 ' and that the jury "was capable of reviewing the evidence
to determine whether the [g]overnment met its burden to show that
the images depicted real children. 1 6 Furthermore, in United States v.
Farrelly,the Sixth Circuit held that a jury could determine whether an
evidence such as
image was a virtual creation and that no additional
147
real identity or expert testimony was necessary.
These cases demonstrate that the government's fears (outlined in
Free Speech Coalition) surrounding the difficulty in prosecuting
purveyors of child pornography are real and growing, especially in the
wake of this Supreme Court decision-a decision that further tied the
hands of prosecutors.
Indeed, after Free Speech Coalition, appellate courts reversed
convictions, some without the opportunity of retrial, and set aside
guilty pleas. Still no jury acquitted a defendant on the basis that he
was ignorant that his pornographic images were of actual children.
IV. The PROTECT Act and United States v. Williams
The congressional response to Free Speech Coalition and its
wake of inconsistent lower court decisions came in the form of the
PROTECT Act. 149 The PROTECT Act acknowledged the Free
Speech Coalition decision, but recognized the detrimental impact of
that case on child pornography prosecutions. To comport with Free
Speech Coalition, the PROTECT Act modified the language of the
CPPA to prohibit visual depictions "that [are] of, or [are] virtually

144. United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002).
145. United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004).
146. Id.
147. United States v. Farrelly, 389 F.3d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 2004).
148. John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of
CongressionalEfforts to Reduce the Government's Burden of Proof in Child Pornography
Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205, 220-21 (2003) (noting that no jury has acquitted based on
lack of knowledge defense).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2008).
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indistinguishable from that of an actual minor."5 Further, to fit
within Free Speech Coalition's mandate, the definition in the
PROTECT Act expressly excludes depictions "that are drawings,
cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults.'. 1
The PROTECT Act also attempted to respond to the Supreme
Court's rejection of the CPPA's pandering provision by substituting
what Congress thought was more narrowly tailored language.152 The
PROTECT Act sought to punish anyone who knowingly advertises,
promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits by any means (including by
computer) any purported material in a manner that reflects the belief,
or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material
contains an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct or a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.'53
In drafting the PROTECT Act to comply with Free Speech
Coalition, Congress resurrected the market deterrence and indirect
harm rationales rejected in Free Speech Coalition, justifying the new
pandering provision on the grounds that "even fraudulent offers to
buy or sell unprotected child pornography help to sustain the illegal
market for this material.' 5 4 Congress also argued that this new
pandering provision was crucial to assisting prosecutors' ability to
convict child pornographers. "5
Though significantly narrower than its CPPA counterpart, the
language of the PROTECT Act has not, however, escaped First
Amendment challenges for overbreadth. The lack of a nexus
between the pandering of obscenity and proving the existence of any
actual obscene material, for example, suggests that protected speech
could be punished because of its marketing. This suggestion is due to
the fact that criminal liability under the PROTECT Act does not
require any underlying obscene material to be possessed or
distributed. These were precisely the issues raised in United States v.

150. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 6-7 (2003). Congress intended an objective, reasonable
person standard-an ordinary observer-in determining whether a "virtually
indistinguishable" depiction looked like an actual child. Id.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (2008).
152. See id. at § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
153.
154.

Id.
S. REP. No. 108-2, at 12 (2003).

155. Id. at 23-24.
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decision that tested the constitutionality
Williams, the Supreme Court
56
Act."
PROTECT
of the
In Williams, the defendant, Michael Williams, posted a message
in a public Internet chat room claiming that "Dad of toddler has
'good' pics of her an [sic] me for swap of your toddler pics, or live
cam."' 57 Williams then told an undercover Secret Service agent that
he had pictures of himself and other men sexually abusing his fouryear-old daughter, and he also requested pictures of the agent's
daughter. 8 Next, Williams then posted a public message that read:
"HERE ROOM; I CAN PUT UPLINK CUZ IM FOR REAL....,,9
This posting contained a link to photographs of children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct."6 Williams was charged with possessing and
promoting child pornography under the PROTECT Act.16' He
entered a conditional plea of guilty, but reserved his right to challenge
the constitutionality of the pandering62 offense on overbreadth
grounds. 63
Analyzing the PROTECT Act for substantial overbreadth, the
District Court found the statute to be "a legitimate effort to close the
market for child pornography, which has seen a revival as a result of
technology."' ' The District Court also found that any prohibition of
protected speech that results from the PROTECT Act's sweep "is not
substantial, particularly in light of the statute's logical sweep."' 6' The
Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed" on the grounds that because
the statute was not concerned with the actual content of the purported
child pornography (but rather punished any speech expressing a
belief about its content), the PROTECT Act "wrongly punishes
individuals for the non-inciteful expression of their thoughts and

156. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830.
157. Id. at 1837.
158. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2006).
159. Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1837.
160. Id.
161. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1289.
162. Id.; Although the PROTECT Act does not include the word "pandering," the
offenses of advertising, promoting, presenting, and distributing are commonly referred to
as such and will be referred to as "pandering" in this Note.
163. Id.
164. United States v. Williams, No. 04-20299, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30603, at 34 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 20, 2004).
165. Id.
166. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1309.
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beliefs.', 67 The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that the pandering
provision "abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of
lawful speech in relation to its legitimate sweep" and struck it down
as overbroad.'
The Supreme Court reversed.'69 Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia held that a statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth
doctrine only "if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech.., not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep."'7
In the opinion, Scalia first construed the PROTECT Act to
exclude "abstract advocacy" of the illegality of child pornography,
reading the "advertises, promotes, presents, distributes" language as
"hav[ing] a transactional connotation. '17' This distinction is important
because it expresses the Court's recognition of the broader market for
child pornography and the indirect harm it creates. While the Free
Speech Coalition Court rejected such indirect harm as not being a
compelling governmental interest in proscribing the distribution of
child pornography, the Williams decision places indirect harm at the
center of its analysis.
Justice Scalia also defined the scope of the PROTECT Act by
finding that the statute required not only knowledge of pandering or
solicitation, but also one of two types of conduct: either the subjective
belief that the material being pandered or solicited is child
pornography, and the understanding that a reasonable person would
be led to believe that the speaker held that belief, 7 1 or the subjective
intent to cause another person to believe that the material at issue is
child pornography.'73
After construing the PROTECT Act, Justice Scalia asked
whether the statute "criminalizes a substantial amount of protected
expressive activity" to the extent necessary to be constitutionally
overbroad. 4 He answered in the negative, holding that "offers to
engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1305.
Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830.
Id. at 1838.
Id. at 1839.
Id. at 1839-40, 1843.
Id. at 1839-40.
Id. at 1841.
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Amendment protection."' 17 Furthermore, fraudulent offers are
proscribable, as are offers to engage in illegal activity, even where
17 6
"the offeror is mistaken about the factual predicate of his offer.'
Thus, although the PROTECT Act did not require proof of
actual child pornography, the Court found the statute to be consistent
with Ferberand Free Speech Coalition because it would not force the

suppression of "simulated child pornography," but only require that77it
be "offered and sought as such, and not as real child pornography.'
The Court found that the actual content of the material being
pandered or solicited is irrelevant; what matters is the intent of the
solicitor or panderer. A violation of the PROTECT Act occurs even
if the material being pandered is later determined not to be child
pornography; the fact that the panderer offered up the material as
child pornography is enough to constitute a violation. The logic
behind this rationale stems from the same logic that serves to justify
punishment for "attempted" criminal activity; it is well established
that a drug dealer may be validly convicted of an attempted drug sale8
even if it is later determined that he was only selling baking powder.1
Justice Souter dissented, arguing that that the PROTECT Act
was overbroad. Souter maintained that "the First Amendment
protection of... fake child pornography requires a limit to the law's
criminalization of pandering proposals."'79 The PROTECT Act
therefore undermined Ferber and Free Speech Coalition by

circumventing the requirement that a depiction of real children be
proven in order for a prosecution to succeed. Justice Souter rejected
the majority's holding that pandering proposals and attempted crimes
are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.
Instead, Justice Souter believed that the constitutionality of a statute
that criminalizes such conduct should "turn on its consequences for
protected expression and the law that protects it."' 8 ' Here, "a
protected category of expression [non-obscene pornography created
using adults] would inevitably be suppressed."'" Even so, Justice
Souter would have upheld the statute if he had found it to be
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1842-43.
1844 (emphasis omitted).
1853 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
1849 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
1854 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1854-55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1855 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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"grounded in a realistic, factual assessment of harm." ' 3 Justice
Souter contended that the PROTECT Act lacked any such
"substantial

justification ' 8

and

should

have

been

found

unconstitutional because it substantially inhibited protected speech.
Conclusion
Though the Free Speech Coalition Court agreed with the goal of
the CPPA that the proliferation of child pornography is a serious
crisis that demands increased government regulation, ultimately the
Court's greater concern in that case was for preserving those areas of
protected speech that the CPPA could criminalize. Thus, the Free
Speech Coalition Court's fear that the scope of the CPPA was so
broad that it would subsume and proscribe protected speech was
great enough to justify striking down that legislation on overbreadth
grounds.
Thus, the PROTECT Act was intended to resolve these
problems by establishing a narrower, workable scheme that was
limited to effectively quelling the child pornography market and
facilitating prosecutions. Instead of crafting a more limited First
Amendment exception to deal with the realities of today's
technologically advanced virtual child pornography, the new Williams
standard focuses on limiting offers to provide or requests to obtain
child pornography regardless of the nature of the actual content of
the proffered materials.
Free Speech Coalition was problematic on several grounds, and
though Williams has addressed some of those issues, the PROTECT
Act's scheme is arguably just as questionable. First, the Free Speech
Coalition Court failed to recognize that the prevention of indirect
harm to children caused by virtual child pornography is a compelling
government interest. The Williams Court directly addressed this
problem by recognizing that virtual imagery feeds the broader child
pornography market. Indeed, under Williams there need not be any
direct harm to children, as pandering virtual imagery proffered as
child pornography is criminal.
Additionally, Free Speech Coalition created too heavy a burden
for government to effectively prosecute child pornography offenses.
In addition to failing to criminalize virtual child pornography, the
Court failed to recognize the difficulty in distinguishing between
183. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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permissible virtual imagery and proscribable actual imagery by
allowing defendants the affirmative defense of arguing their material
was virtual. With no clear framework for the trier of fact to
distinguish between the two types of imagery, prosecutions were
rendered ineffective. The Williams Court did not directly address the
technological quandary.
Instead of devising a rubric for
differentiating between the two types of imagery, or declaring virtual
child pornography illegal, the Williams Court sidestepped the issues
presented by technological advancement by focusing on the collateral
speech surrounding the material as opposed to the material itself.
Furthermore, Free Speech Coalition created confusion in the
lower courts as to how to consistently adjudicate child pornography
cases because the standard to be applied was so broad. It is still too
soon to know what the judicial response to Williams will be, and
whether this decision construes the PROTECT Act in a sufficiently
narrow way so as to establish a coherent and enforceable standard.
Though the Court asserts that the scheme established in Williams is
not overbroad in its scope, the PROTECT Act is arguably just as
overbroad as its counterpart, the CPPA, and therefore not an
effective solution. As the Free Speech Coalition Court specifically
stated, "The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the
means to suppress unlawful speech," because "[p]rotected speech
does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the
'
latter."185
In Williams, however, the Court seems to be doing just that;
proscribing an espoused belief as a means of suppressing child
pornography.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the PROTECT Act and the
Williams decision are underinclusive, and will therefore prove to be
ineffective at suppressing virtual child pornography.
Though
Williams likely establishes an effective mechanism for dealing with
the distribution of child pornography, the holding could prove to be
problematic because it does not directly address virtual child
pornography as a crisis in its own right, but rather criminalizes the
pandering of imagery held out as child pornography. Pornography
depicting actual children is criminal regardless of how it is pandered,
but pornography depicting virtual children is not criminal, according
to Williams, if it is not pandered as child pornography. Thus, neither
the creation nor the possession of this material has been proscribed,

185. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255.
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and may still be distributed as if it is held out as something other than
"child pornography."
Can this new scheme really be an effective means of controlling
this harmful imagery? It would seem that for those dealing in this
repugnant material, the PROTECT Act proscribes how they market
their photos, not the photos themselves. Advancement in technology
has driven the modern explosion of virtual child pornography as a
means of circumventing child pornography law, and only time will tell
whether this new focus will be effective in finally quelling both the
direct and indirect harm caused by virtual child pornography. It is
very likely that Williams will not be the final word on the subject.

